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REJOINDER TO ELIZABETH BURY 
Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Sabina Deitrick, 
and Scott Campbell 
I t  is always good to have additional empirical evidence for one's work In  
her  regressions on the relationship between U.S. mil itary procurement spend­
ing and state-level changes in growth rates over the period 1 977 to 1 986, 
Elizabeth Bury adds to the body of work confirming a statistically significant 
and positive correlation between the two. What puzzles us is the interpretation 
that Bury places on these results, especially her suggestion that they refute our 
contention about the substantial contribution of American military preparedness 
to the economic remapping of the United States. In fact, Bury's formulation 
comes nowhere near capturing the extent of the phenomena we encompass 
with our term "the gunbelt." 
Our work on the gunbelt was prompted by our own multivariate regression 
analysis, in the early 1 980s, of the determinants of state and metropolitan-level 
high-tech plant and employment growth (Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier 1 986). 
There, we showed that defense spending was indeed a significant contributor 
to high-tech growth in the period from 1 972 to 1 977. Although it shared that 
distinction with a number of other features, several others which had received 
much attention in the high-tech literature university research and development 
spending. for instance - turned out to be negatively correlated with high-tech 
performance. At the time, the incipient high-tech literature was full of glowing 
accounts of places like Route 1 28, Orange County, and Silicon Valley, which 
celebrated the role of universities like MIT and Stanford but were completely 
silent on the role of defense industrial development in the building of such com­
plexes. (An exception was Saxenian's [1 985) brilliant recounting. in her Mas­
ter's thesis at Berkeley, of the genesis of Silicon Valley, which she attributed in 
large part to early Cold War funding of semiconductors and computing.) 
We decided to devote our next major research effort to understanding why 
and how Cold War defense activity had contributed to the remarkable shift in 
the center of American manufacturing and economic activity, away from the 
industrial heartland toward what we came several years later to call the "gun­
belt." A shift of this sort had not occurred in any other advanced industrial 
country, save the Soviet Union. In European countries, with divided Germany 
perhaps an exception, pre-World War II dominant urban centers like London, 
Paris, and Milan continued to spawn new leading-edge manufacturing activity, 
albeit often on their peripheries. In the U.S., in contrast, the Cold War cata­
pulted Los Angeles ahead of Chicago as the nation's number one industrial 
city, even past New York in total employment by 1 990. Regional economist 
Charles Tiebout estimated that more than 40 percent of the Los Angeles econ­
omy in the 1 960s was dependent upon defense outlays (Tiebout 1 966). 
The Rise of the Gunbelt· is, as its title bluntly states, an account of the origins 
and behavior underlying this phenomenon. Its major theoretical foci are a 
series of hypotheses about locational behavior in defense-oriented industries 
and a set of plausible models of evolutionary military industrial complex-build­
ing. In our proposal to the National Science Foundation for funding. we 
pleaded to be allowed to use historical and interviewing techniques, arguing 
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that simple number crunching. a Ia High Tech America, would not allow us to 
comprehend the underlying behavioral phenomena. We included a long anec­
dote drawing on a conversation Ann Markusen had with a Grumman official 
about why, if southern California was such an inevitable mecca for aircraft in­
dustry hopefuls, as Cunningham ( 1 95 1 )  contended in his famous study, Grum­
man had successfully been making airplanes on Long Island for most of the 
century. He told Markusen several interesting things, all of which involved 
discretionary behavior, personal preferences, interservice rivalries, etc. In the 
research proposal, we pointed out that if we just analyzed data, we'd throw 
Long Island out as an outlier; yet here was some very important behavioral 
evidence that contradicted the prevailing point of view. NSF bought our argu­
ment and funded the qualitative work. 
At the book's outset, we do claim that the gunbelt is a major, even the major, 
phenomenon in the contemporary economic map of America. We do not prove 
this quantitatively, for reasons that will be clear below, but neither does Bury 
prove that it is not. frankly, the emphatic nature of our statements at the time of 
writing had much to do with the fact that, despite publication of our regression 
results in High Tech America and other academic papers on the subject (Marku­
sen 1 986a, b, and c), scholars like Allan Scott continued to write adulatory em­
pirical papers on endogenous growth in places like Orange County and Silicon 
Valley without once mentioning the region's heavy defense dependency. ( In  
1 984, Santa Clara Valley and Orange County ranked third and fourth among 
American counties in DOD prime contract receipts, at $4.6 and $3.7 billion re­
spectively [Markusen and Yudken 1 992: 1 79) . )  Similarly, book after book, paper 
after paper, was written on interregional migration within the U.S., never once 
mentioning the role that the military services, through recruitment and muster­
ing out, and mil itary industrial companies, through government-funded reloca­
tion of scientists and engineers, had on differential regional growth patterns. 
What we show qualitatively in our book,
· 
through our case studies, is the 
role of the U.S. commitment to Cold War foreign and military policy had in 
reshaping the economic fortunes and differential specialization of U.S. regions. 
Our analysis covers a long period of time, reaching back into the 1 930s, even 
before, and with great emphasis, as Bury notes, on the 1 950s. The story we tell 
is one of clusters of economic agents - military officials, industrial entrepre­
neurs, civic boosters, and members of Congress - working contentiously or 
together to site and build new industrial capability in the aircraft, electronics, 
communications, and computing industries. This was a long. evolutionary pro­
cess, during which new pools of labor were built up in certain favored regions, 
new educational capacity pushed along. and new firrns in new industries 
anchored in remarkably new and underdeveloped towns. In tum, some of 
these firms and cities successfully pioneered and nurtured new commercial 
technologies and products initially funded by the mil itary, boosting them into 
the ranks of high-tech meccas. The inertia of this structure, once in place, 
helped the new military industrial cities to coast through periods of defense 
cutbacks, although not without a great deal of discomfort. 
The empirical exercise Bury perforrns doesn't come close to capturing the 
complexity of this process or the many tentacles of the Pentagon's reach. Bury 
quotes us stating "in large part, . . .  (the) differential growth rates and income 
effects (in states over the past forty years) were the result of military spending 
differentials and the construction of high tech industrial complexes." Besides 
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ignoring the " in large part, • she then goes on to formulate a hypothesis that 
includes only military spending differentials, and only those in recent year.;, 
ignoring completely the second half of the statement, which captures the 
investment in a built environment and labor pools that are so central to our 
concept of the gunbelt. 
The gunbelt as a phenomenon encompasses much more than contemporary 
Pentagon procurement spending. First of all, procurement, reflected in both 
Bury's and our use of prime contract data, accounts for only 40 to 60 percent 
of the Pentagon budget, depending on the year, the rest going into operations 
and maintenance and per.;onnel. In 1 987, for instance, the latter two categories 
accounted for 59 percent of all spending, compared with just 41 percent for pro­
curement. Patterns of spending in the latter categories reinforce the gunbelt­
oriented bias - in 1 983, for instance, only the South Atlantic, West South Cen­
tral, Mountain, and Pacific regions had personnel receipts per capita in excess 
of the national average, while the Mid-Atlantic and Ea5t North Central states 
were more than 50 percent below the national norm (Stein 1 985: Table 3) .  
The fact that military bases and facilities are predominantly in the gunbelt both 
attracted private defense activity there and is a contributor in and of itself to 
postwar shifts in population and economic growth. Bury's independent varia­
ble does not pick up this rather major contribution. 
Second, in addition to the omissions of NASA and DOE defense-related acti­
vity Bury mentions as problems with her data, defense prime contract measures 
do not reflect the considerable companion effect of arms sales, a major American 
export component in the postwar period. Last year alone, U.S. firms exorted 
$41 billion in arms overseas, exclusive of black market transactions, and 
throughout the 1 980s the level fluctuated between $ 1 0  and $20 billion. Those 
order.; are registered particularly strongly in existing defense procurement 
regions, especially in aerospace and electronics complexes, and are thus a mili­
tary-related source of growth. Bury's dependent variable does not capture 
these, and leaves them to be interpreted, by default, as '"nondefense" growth 
factors. 
Third, and most problematic, the contemporary performance of a place like 
Sil icon Valley or Orange County or Route 128  is much indebted to the rounds 
of prior accumulation - of technology, of technical expertise or personnel, of 
equipment and facil ities underwritten by the defense effort. Labor pools were 
constructed through government-financed moves of scientists and engineer.;, 
for instance, over decades. More than 50 percent of the graduates of top-rated 
engineering schools in the midwest have gone south or west after graduation 
for decades, an internal brain drain heavily financed by taxpayers. Similarly, 
the fact that the services recruit or draft ubiquitously and pay for military­
related migration to disproportionately gunbelt-sited military facilities means 
that both blue-collar labor and military retirement communities' location is 
skewed. In the single, remarkably ignored study inquiring into the effect of 
military-related moves, Long (1 976) found that mil itary-related migration was 
larger in size than any other source of internal migration in the U.S. for the 
period 1 969 to 1 976. We have recently completed two empirical exercises 
into mil itary-industrial-related migration and have found substantial evidence 
for heavy net flows in the direction of the gunbelt (Markusen and Campbell 
1 989; Ellis, Barff, and Markusen 1 992). No analysis, even of one decade, 
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could capture the lagged effect of such military investments operating through 
the subsequent activities of these various occupational and population groups. 
In recent pathbreaking wortc, Hooks and Bloomquist ( 1 992) have developed 
empirical measures of military industrial infrastructure that show that public 
investment in plant and equipment during World War I I, the bulk of it subse­
quently sold to private firms, made a sizeable and significant contribution to 
growth in manufacturing in the 1 94 7-1 972 period. They argue that the impact 
of much of this expenditure occurs over decades, and that lagged time series 
regressions over long periods are the only way to capture the cumulative 
effects (Hooks and Bloomquist 1 992). 
It's not just a question of labor flows and capital location, however. The 
discovery, innovation, and provision of markets during crucial infant industry 
stages for everything from computers to semiconductors to communications 
satellites and jet aircraft was linked to the Cold War. The phenomenon of the 
gunbelt is designed, in our conception, to capture this enduring contribution 
to regional growth and development. Contemporary levels of defense spend­
ing capture only the current government demand for output from these com­
plexes, not the investment effects of mil itary-initiated assembly of land, labor, 
and capital there over the years. 
We see no contradiction between our contention of a major, even dominant, 
role of mil itary-commissioned activity in the postwar repatterning of American 
economic activity and Bury's findings. In our view, a good deal of the variation 
in state growth rates that remains unexplained in her exercise can be attributed 
to both the omissions and the longer-term growth effects of military-related 
location and regional investment patterns. Our argument here is analogous to 
that of Uchtenberg's, where he posits that defense shares of national invest­
ment have been underestimated in the U.S. and then shows that a good deal 
of what was considered "private" investment in the economy was actually 
"military" in nature, undertaken in anticipation of future defense contracts 
(Uchtenberg 1 987). 
Methodology 
A few comments on Bury's empirical results and interpretations are also in 
order. Because she doesn't do a multivariate analysis, she doesn't show us 
that any other variables could do better than defense spending at explaining 
state growth differentials, a fact she acknowledges. It is strange that she con­
siders her results to belie a "strong" relationship, referring to an r-squared of 
.22, not bad for a cross-sectional analysis. (few cross-sectional analyses of 
U.S. regional growth differentials, even kitchen sink models, have ever attained 
r-squares in excess of .50 or .60.) However, "strength"" in an econometric rela­
tionship is usually assessed by looking at the size of the coefficient, not the r­
squared, and gauging just how much increase in growth one might expect 
from a given increase in mil itary spending. Bury doesn't do this for us, and we 
wish she would. It might help communities now facing severe cuts in military 
prime contracts to plan, at least in the short run. 
Bury admits that adjusting procurement data for subcontracting will give a 
more accurate estimate of regional procurement flows, but understandably 
does not do that here and uses prime contracts in the independent variable. 
(However frustrating, most agree that available subcontracting data are of 
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poor quality.) Thus, the measurement errors in the independent variable imply 
that the least-squares estimates are biased and inconsistent. In  part because 
of the inconsistency and bias of the results - which again cannot be estimated 
accurately with the data sets available - we elected to present the data through 
simple location quotients and standardized indices rather than compound the 
errors through more statistical testing. The author points out that probable 
measurement errors with procurement data would bias the results downward. 
Thus the true regression model would strengthen both the significance and 
the fit of the model. 
In  specifying her variables, she standardizes them and opts against using 
real defense spending for her independent variable. While it's reasonable to 
conclude that the CPI, the G N P  deflator, and the government purchases 
deflator might have some problems for defense spending. why didn't the 
author select the national defense implicit price deflator? It is precisely the 
deflator she is describing and allows her to look at real dollar changes. 
The most original and interesting of Bury's findings are those that follow from 
her experiments in lagging the formulation. She begins her model with the 
assumption that time makes no difference in the relationship between procure­
ment and regional income by specifying prime contracts as an average over the 
years from 1 977 to 1 986. She relaxes this assumption by adding time lags to 
the model. She uses three years, and finds that the correlation is stronger the 
longer the lag. With time becoming increasingly important, we are curious if 
Bury considered respecifying her independent variable to account for this very 
important factor, rather than using an average over the years. This bears out 
our experience and helps to explain why the pain is currently only beginning 
to be felt in defense-dependent subnational economies more than two years 
after defense outlays began to fall significantly in 1 989. These findings under­
score the long. evolutionary nature of the phenomenon at hand. They suggest 
that if we could build a complex model, with military investments in plant, 
equipment, and human capital included, we might indeed find that contempo­
rary regional growth rate differentials were as much if not more a product of 
prior rounds of military industrial expenditure than of current outlays. 
Even with these comments in mind, Bury's model as it stands shows defense 
spending "explaining" over one-fifth of regional (state) growth, actually more 
than its employment share. Bury overreacts here by focusing on the statistics, 
rather than the variables they represent. "The data clearly show that military 
spending is NOT the overriding determinant of growth: other factors account 
for a far greater proportion of the variation. . . :· Yes, statistically, but what are 
these factors? We are interested in regional growth and the role of planning 
and policymaking in that growth. Bury's model estimates that defense explains 
more than 20 percent of regional income growth. She does not go on to demon­
strate that any other factor by itself accounts for that much growth. It's impor­
tant for us as planners to understand that Bury's 22 percent of regional growth 
resulted from policies and decisions in the public sector. With the end of the 
Cold War, the U.S. will spend $270 billion (down from a high of $300 billion) 
this coming fiscal year on defense. In  part, this is not because defense spending 
is an insignificant component of regional growth, but because it is significant. 
We also disagree with Bury's speculation that the multiplier effects of defense 
�pending may be lower than those for other economic activities. There is a 
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substantial literature simulating defense versus non-defense expenditure pat­
terns (including tax reductions) that suggests that military spending may indeed 
be less expansionary (see for instance Bezdek 1 975; Anderson, Bischak, and 
Oden 1 991) .  However, there are other studies, by the Congressional Budget 
Office, for instance, that claim that the effects are a wash. Our own view is that 
all existing macroeconomic models do not take into account the extent to which 
defense spending is manufacturing-intensive and "buy-America" in nature, 
which amplifies its impacts on the economy rather more than equivalent out­
lays in social spending or private consumption. Indeed, in the 1 980s, the mili­
tary buildup was probably more stimulative than most economists have under­
stood, obscuring the structural deterioration in commercial manufacturing and 
setting the stage for the current severe recession (Markusen 1 992). 
For our part, we think Bury's work is a good start at documenting quantita­
tively the ways in which American military policy has and continues to affect 
regional growth patterns. It would be a formidable task to thoroughly chart the 
contribution of the Cold War buildup to contemporary economic geography, 
just as it would be to untangle the total net contribution of the interstate free. 
way system (also a defense activity in its origins!). We will be content if the 
bodies of location theory and regional growth theory, with empirical counter­
parts, simply acknowledge the powerful role that military activity has played, 
ending a long and unwarranted silence in the post-Viet Nam literature. 
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